编号：e-2024-5-1
题目：multi-product monopolist and information design
作者：fanqi shi, yutong zhang, litian chen
九游会平台的联系方式：fanqi shi, ericshi@pku.edu.cn
摘要： we study the information design and pricing decision of a multi-product monopolist who faces a buyer with unit demand. under omniscient disclosure, we show that one profit-maximizing menu reveals the identity of the highest quality product and allocates that product, provided a type-specific quality threshold is met. this menu remains optimal under private disclosure if the buyer’s value has constant differences in quality and type, or if the value has non-decreasing differences in quality and type and the threshold type is independent of quality. we also characterize the conditions under which an ex-ante and non-discriminatory posted price mechanism is optimal.
关键词： information design; optimal mechanism; multi-product monopolist; omniscient disclosure; private disclosure; price discriminatio