编号：e-2024-12-1
题目：curbing bureaucratic information manipulation: evidence from a statistical reform in china
作者：yongwei nian
九游会平台的联系方式：yongwei nian, yongweinian@gmail.com
摘要：bureaucrats are often incentivized to manipulate information, which may have real consequences. leveraging china’s 2009 reform punishing economic data manipulation and counties’ quasi-random reform exposure, this paper provides rich causal evidence showing that the reform led to: (1) a decrease in gdp growth manipulation amounting to 5% of reported gdp growth, driven by a reputational discipline effect; (2) an increase in local officials’ development effort manifested in both policy changes and downstream impacts, consistent with an effort reallocation effect. these results thus highlight the far-reaching costs of such manipulation and the welfare implications of curbing it.